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Abstract
Litigation settlement is one of the most applicable
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Litigants
need not exhaust their resources in order to solve their
disputes. However, administrative settlement is
comparatively rarer than it is in civil disputes. Major
reasons for the rareness of administrative settlement
are the consideration of public suspicion and difficulty
of balancing private and public interests, either of
which applies to settlement achieved during
administrative trial proceeding.
When settling
administrative disputes, stipulated procedural
requirements are to be satisfied before entering into
substantial issues. For instance, whether litigants have
power of disposition of the disputed issues, or should
the relevant third parties be notified to intervene?
Once procedural requirements are met, what factors
should the government agency or the trial court
consider in order to grant that settlement, for instance,
the maintenance of the public interest? This article
illustrates the administrative settlement procedure of
Taiwan, particularly of that of administrative litigation
settlement. For better understanding, this article will
take the settlement between Qualcomm and Taiwan
Fair Trade Commission for example. Through this
example, one can better comprehend how settlement
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is processed from beginning to end. Along with the
elucidation of the example, this article responds to the
pro and con opinions regarding the Qualcomm case as
well. The content of the settlement and the response
enunciated in this article might not adequately satisfy
every involved party or critic; however, they do
provide valuable information for those who wish to
continue their research in depth on this domain.
Keywords: Qualcomm, Litigation Settlement, Public Interests,
Power of Disposition, Government Agency, Agency Action, Judicial
Review
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PREFACE

In light of the doctrine of the separation of powers1 and the
principle of acting in accordance with the law, government agencies2
are delegated by Congress3 with the authorities to formulate policies,
to make rules4 that relate to its authority, and to provide services to
1
The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches are supposed to form
a check and balance system, through which each branch can practice its function
as described by Chief Justice John Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1,
46 (1825):
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of
the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a
subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter
unnecessarily.
Marshall’s explanation of government branches properly depicts the
nexus among them.
2
Just like 5 U.S.C. § 551, Art. 3 ¶ 2 of the Taiwan Administrative
Procedure Act (TAPA) exempts the following organizations from the law: (1)
People’s representative bodies at various levels; (2) Judicial authorities; and (3)
Supervisory authorities. Unlike Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. 788 (1992), which
held that the United States president’s statutorily required action is not a
reviewable administrative procedure, the Supreme Administrative Court of
Taiwan does not make it clear whether or not the president is excluded from the
definition of an agency of the TAPA. Xingzheng Chengxu Fa (行政程序法)
[Administrative Procedure Act] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Feb. 3,
1999, amended Dec. 30, 2015) (Taiwan), Art. 3, ¶ 2, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (
全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030055
[https://perma.cc/9H66-4D4N] [hereinafter Administrative Procedure Act].
3
Take the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for instance.
Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 and created the FTC
with the authority to prohibit unfair competitive commercial activities. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41, 45.
4
For instance, in 2020 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of Taiwan
announced several rules and policies particularly applicable for prevention and
control of the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring people to follow the promulgated
rules and penalizing those who disobeyed: “People must wear masks in eight
types of public venues, and those who [refuse] to follow the rule after being
advised to do so will be fined.” TAIWAN CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/dBMqsXbksOSbNf87zyfRA?typeid=158 [https://perma.cc/75WA-MA59]. The terminology of
rules may vary; however, in accordance with their nature, rules can be divided
into three categories as interpretive rules, procedural rules and substantive rules.
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the people.5 In addition, government agencies can also issue orders
in accordance with its governing statutes 6 and adjudicate
administrative disputes7 for the first instance8 and impose sanctions
upon those who violate the rules promulgated by the agencies.9 Once
the government agency has issued an order or imposed a sanction

See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1386 (2004) (listing the variety of policymaking tools available to
federal agencies).
5
For instance, government agencies provide postal services, maintain
national parks for citizens’ leisure purposes, etc. See WILLIAM F. FUNK &
RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMIN. LAW 12 (5th ed. 2016) (describing various
agencies, including those that disburse entitlements and manage federal property).
6
These are sometimes considered the “organization acts” in Taiwan. For
example, the Act of the Organization of Intellectual Property Office of Taiwan
enumerates the authorities of that agency. Jingji Bu Zhihui Caichan Ju Zuzhi
Tiaoli (經濟部智慧財產局組織條例) [Act of the Organization of Intellectual
Property Office, Ministry of Economic Affairs] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Nov. 4, 1998, amended Dec. 28, 2011) (Taiwan), FAWUBU
FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the
Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0000061
[https://perma.cc/8D8F-CG2M].
7
Though administrative statutes in Taiwan do not explicitly detail that
government agencies can “adjudicate” administrative controversies, government
agencies are, same as that of Art. Ⅲ, §1 of the United States Constitution,
delegated by the legislature branch with the authority to take the first review of
the actions made by their subordinates. See Suyuan Fa (訴願法) [Administrative
Appeal Act] (promulgated by the Executive Yuan, Mar. 24, 1930, amended June
27, 2012) (Taiwan), Art. 1, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws
and Regulations Database of the Republic of China],
https://1aw.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=GO400001
[https://perma.cc/AZ7S-VFTM] [hereinafter Administrative Appeal Act].
8
According to Art. 71 of the Patent Act of Taiwan, when the validity of
a previously granted patent is challenged, the Specific Patent Agency will conduct
a hearing in order to make its decision. Zhuanli Fa (專利法) [Patent Act]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, May 29, 1944, amended May
1, 2019) (Taiwan), Arts. 71, 74, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫)
[Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawHistory.aspx?pcode=J0070007
[https://perma.cc/XUM7-394S].
9
STEVEN J. CANN, ADMIN. LAW 14 (4th ed., 2006); see, e.g., Pierce v.
SEC, 786 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concerning an SEC investigation
into a trading scheme).
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upon a person, 10 the dissatisfied person who directly receives the
agency action 11 or those who are to be adversely affected or
aggrieved by the action may have standing to seek judicial review12
should they be able to prove that the government agency has legally
erred in making the action.13 When reviewing, the court can either
sustain or reverse the government agency’s action, or issue a writ of
mandamus14 compelling the agency that received the complaint to
readdress its action in accordance with the judgment.15 Also after
10

Like the Administrative Procedure Act of the United States, a “person”
normally includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or
private organization other than an agency. See Taiwan Administrative Procedure
Act Art. 96.
11
A government agency’s action sometimes may be referred to as
“administrative action” or “administrative disposition” in Taiwan. 5 U.S.C. §
551(13) defines that agency action “includes the whole or a part of any agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure
to act,” whereas TAPA section 92 ¶ 1 defines “administrative disposition” as “a
unilateral administrative act with direct external effects, rendered by an
administrative authority in making a decision or taking other actions within its
public authority, in respect to a specific matter in the area of public law.” The
similarity shared in these actions is that the government agency action is a
unilateral administrative act which creates legal effect to public or specific
persons.
12
Judicial review is only available for what has been characterized as an
“agency action” in substance. See Pharm. Mfs. Ass’nv. v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp.
1224 (D. Md. 1971) (contemplating whether there was “agency action”);
Trucking Ass’n v. U.S., 755 F.2d 1292, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing the
petition for review because the report did not constitute a “final agency action”).
13
When proving relevance, one should explain the traceability or
causality between the government agency action and the damages he has suffered
or the rights that have been affected. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976) (holding that a federal court can only redress an injury that
can be fairly traced to the challenged action of a government agency); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding that judicial review turns on whether an
administrative opinion constitutes “final agency action”).
14
5 U.S.C. § 706(1); Xingzheng Susong Fa (行政訴訟法)
[Administrative Litigation Act] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Nov. 17,
1932, amended Jan. 15, 2020) (Taiwan), Art. 5, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國
法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030154
[https://perma.cc/QA49-3T8W] [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Act].
15
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). Same as
Germany, the court may specifically instruct the government agency to redress an
action or decision which fully or partly meets the claims of the plaintiff. In
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having inquired about litigants’ willingness, the court may resort
disputes to alternative resolutions when appropriate and fair.
Since the actions of government agencies are closely related
to the daily conduct of people, 16 the administrative actions must
conform to certain norms and not violate the fundamental principles
of administrative law,17 such as the principle of proportionality,18 the
principle of prohibition of arbitrary and capricious, 19 and the
principle of equality20. And since the executive branch is originally
Germany, those legal actions are called “Verpflichtungsklage”. See
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [Administrative Court Code] § 42.
16
U.S. v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Frankfurter, opined that:
It is not consistent which the theory of our government that the
legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime,
find the fact of guilt, and adjudge the punishment by one of its own
agents . . . It must be remembered that the deportation proceeding is an
exercise of adjudicative, not rule-making, power.” This case properly
illustrates how an agency action can affect citizens’ lives and what
attribute an agency action should be construed
17
Parts of those principles are explicitly stipulated in the law, and parts
of them are inferred from the laws, mainly the Administrative Procedure Act.
Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 7.
18
In the common law system, the term “principle of proportionality” is
not a term that has an easily discernible meaning as it does in the civil law system.
See George A. Bermann, The Principle of Proportionality, 26 AM. J. COMPAR. L.,
415(1978). (“American law, in short, provides no easy answer to the question of
proportionality in administrative action.”).
19
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A similar regulation is found in Art. 10 of the
Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act, which states: “[in] exercising
administrative discretion, an administrative authority shall not transgress the
scope of its power of discretion set forth by law and shall comply with the
purposes of the authority conferred by law or regulations.” Administrative
Procedure Act, Art. 10. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that an agency rule would be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency relied on factors which Congress had not intended it
to consider).
20
“The so-called ‘equality principle’ means that unless the
administrative agency has justifiable reason, it cannot commit administrative
actions or treat the object differently.” Jian Nan Co. v. Intellectual Property
Office, Zuigao Xinzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative
Court], 88 Pan Zi No. 3724 (88 年度判字第 3724 號判決) (1999) (Taiwan). The
judgment fully illustrates that if people are situated in the same conditions, the
government agency should, when taking any administrative action, treat every
person equally unless otherwise permitted by law.
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entrusted by the people as the major branch of the government to
execute administrative activities, 21 it must take into account the
balance between the public interest and private rights when
implementing its duties.22 As the actions of government agencies are
supposed to balance both public and private interests, questions arise:
should the punitive agency action continue to be executed if the
involved parties’ interests later change,23 or should the agency settle
the dispute with the party subject to the agency decision when
circumstances surrounding the decision become unfavorable? 24
These questions turn into critical issues not only for the government
agency who initiated the action but also for the trial court.
This article will enunciate the settlement procedure in an
administrative litigation in Taiwan, and what factors shall the court
consider in accordance with the law. For better understanding, this
21

In democratic states, the executive branches’ authority is normally
delegated by the legislative branch, whose members are elected by the people;
therefore, the executive branches’ authority is considered indirect delegation by
the people. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 35 (5th ed. 2004).
22
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (evaluating whether
the termination of public assistance payments without an opportunity to be heard
violated plaintiff’s due process rights).
23
The Taiwan Administrative Litigation Act Art. 203 ¶ 1 states that
“When the situation changed unexpectedly after the public contract had been
established, and the performance of that original contract is therefore considered
unfair, the administrative court may, upon the request of the parties, replace the
content of that contract by increasing, reducing the payment or changing,
eliminating the original effect of that contract with a judgment,” whereas ¶ 2
regulates that “The administrative agency, as one of the involving parties, for the
sake of preventing public interests from suffering apparently significant harm,
may also in accordance with the preceding paragraph petition to the court to
replace the original contract with a judgment.” Administrative Litigation Act,
supra note 14, Art. 203, paras. 1–2. This stipulation is considered the “principle
of situation variation.”
24
Whether government agencies are able to settle disputes with private
counterparts has been a controversial issue in the administrative law domain.
Negative opinion believes that government agencies can only process public
affairs in accordance with the laws without sacrificing public interest, however,
positive opinion considers that it is not as good as settlement when government
agencies have to exhaust a great amount of public resources for a vague result of
fact and legal disputes. See CHEN CHING-HSIOU, ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
LAW, 567–568 (2013) (outlining the supporting and dissenting opinions for
administrative litigation settlement).
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article will also introduce the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan
(TFTC) sanction of Qualcomm Inc. for violating the Fair Trade Act
between 2015 and 2017. This case ended with a court settlement,
which precisely depicts how an administrative dispute can be settled
through an alternative resolution procedure rather than through the
courts.

II.

SETTLEMENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION

Litigation settlements normally achieve dual effects.25 One
effect is the termination of the trial procedure,26 and the other is the
resolution of substantial disputes between litigants.27 When litigants
agree to settle their disputes, the content of the settlement will then
supersede the original claims for which the plaintiff sued 28 . In
administrative litigation, the original agency actions will be replaced
by the content of the settlement, which means the government agency
bears the obligation to cancel or revoke the original actions and will
be bound by the conditions of the settlement.29 Since the content or
conditions of the settlement will replace the original agency action,
the content or conditions of the settlement should then tightly connect
25

Chang Wun-Yu (張文郁), Xingzheng Susong zhi Susong Hejie (行政
訴訟之訴訟和解) [Litigation Settlement in Administrative Litigation], 108
TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) [Taiwan L.J.] 116, 116 (2008).
26
WU GENG, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 707
(2008); TSAI CHI-FANG, NEW THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF LAW, 338
(2007).
27
TSAI, supra note 26, at 339.
28
Chang, supra note 25, at 131.
29
As regulated in Taiwan Administrative Litigation Act (TALA) Art.
222 that “If the settlement is established, its effect shall be governed by the
provisions of Art. 223, Art. 214 and Art. 226.” Art. 214 ¶ 1 states “[i]n addition
to the parties, the determination of the judgment is also effective for those who
are the successors of the parties and those who occupy the subject matter of the
request for the parties or their successors.” Additionally, Art. 216 ¶ 1 stipulates
that “[a] judgment that revokes or changes the original sanction or decision shall
have the effect of binding the relevant agencies in relation to the incident.” In
accordance with the articles mentioned above, the conditions of the settlement
shall have binding power to the involved litigants as well as various government
agencies once the settlement has been completed. Administrative Litigation Act,
supra note 14, Arts. 222, 214, 216. See also, CHEN MIN, GENERAL
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 1560 (2007) (laying out the previously
mentioned TALA articles).
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to the subject matters of the litigation or the disputed issues.30 In
other words, any part of the content or conditions of the settlement
which deviate from the disputed issues will not generate any
adjudicative effect or substantial binding power between litigants in
future judicial dispute anyway,31 except those who participated and
negotiated in making the settlement32.
In fact, aside from litigation settlement, government agencies
themselves may also settle disputes with people before the agency
action or sanction is made. Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act
(TAPA) article 136 states: “Where an administrative authority is
unable to determine the facts or the legal relations as the basis for an
administrative disposition notwithstanding an inquisition process
having been conducted ex officio, it may enter into a compromise or
an administrative contract with a citizen in lieu of administrative
30

CHEN, supra note 29, at 1558. For instance, according to Art. 7 of
TALA, “[w]hen an administrative lawsuit is filed, it is possible to combine claims
for damage or other property payments in the same procedure.” Therefore, when
negotiating for the contents of settlement, damages can be a negotiable issue
along with the issues the plaintiff initially claimed for, even though the damages
issue was not mentioned in beginning.
31
However, in German practice litigants may also settle any legal
disputes that relate to the subject matters of the litigation. The Administrative
Court Act of Germany Art. 106 states:
In order to completely or partly deal with the legal
dispute, those concerned may reach a settlement for
the record of the court, or of the commissioned, or
requested judge insofar as they are able to dispose
of the subject-matter of the settlement. A judicial
settlement may also be concluded by those
concerned accepting a proposal of the court, of the
presiding judge or of the reporting judge issued in
the form of an order, in writing vis-a-vis the court.
Similarly, some Taiwanese scholars believe that litigants are not bound
to the disputed subject matters when negotiating for the content of the settlement.
See LIOU TZONG-DER & PENG FENG-ZHI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 496 (Weng
Yueh-Sheng ed., 3d. ed. 2006) (stating that the content of settlements must be
related to but does not need to be the same as the content of litigations); CHEN,
supra note 24, at 570 (stating that the content of settlements are not limited to
litigated matters).
32
See CHANG WUN-YU, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, INTERLEAVING OF
SUBSTANTIALITY AND PROCEDURE 270–271 (2014) (explaining that content or
conditions exceeding the sorted disputes may still have binding power among
participating parties in other civil litigation as a settlement made in private).
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disposition in order to settle the dispute and to effectively achieve the
purpose of administration.” 33 According to the article, the
government agency may settle disputes with people either for the sake
of insufficient information of the fact which it has been inquiring into,
or for the uncertainty of the complexity of the legal issues.34 In line
with the conditions illustrated above, one can easily understand that
cost is the major concern.35 The above mentioned settlement, also
known as the “administrative settlement,” as depicted by the plain
meaning of the text of the article, can only be implemented when the
government agency failed to acquire sufficient factual and legal
information which is necessary for the agency to make its final
actions accordingly. In other words, the government agency must
have substantially engaged in the investigation of the fact and the
collection of necessary evidence for the making of the final agency
action and only when it was unable to complete that task can it then
enter into a settlement with the citizen.36 The government agency
cannot simply choose to settle the dispute without first taking
measures to deal with any current controversies related to the case.
Settlement shall not be regarded as an alternative relief for the
government agency’s inaction.37
33

Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 136.
Id. The administrative settlement proceeding among government
agencies and parties or persons is not mandatory in any form. Its purpose is to
facilitate the ability to use the various forms of alternative dispute resolution,
same as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584.
35
Chang, supra note 25, at 125.
36
See Lin Ming-Chiang (林明鏘), Xingzheng Qiyue Falun—Yi Deguo
Xingzheng Qiyuefa Wei Zhongxin Shipping Fawubu Xingzheng Chengxu Fa
Minguo Bashisannian Siyue Caoan (行政契約法論—以德國行政契約法為中心
試評法務部行政程序法民國八十三年四月草案) [The Theory of Administrative
Contract Law—A Trial Review of the Draft of the Administrative Procedure Law
of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of China in April 1993 in Accordance
with the Administrative Contract Law of Germany], 24 (國立臺灣大學法學論叢)
[NAT. TAIWAN UNI. L. J.], 143, 174 (1994) (discussing Certain types of
administrative disputes that are not suitable for settlement due to specific
attributes, for instance the approval of a physician license, test assessment, etc.).
37
See PAUL STELKENS, HEINZ JOACHIM BONK & MICHAEL SACHS,
VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ, 8. 2014, §55 Rn. 34 (discussing some
German scholars’ belief that the government agency must have engaged in the
fact finding procedure first, and only when insufficient evidence is collected can it
enter into settlement with that specific person). See also Sheng Tzu-Lung (盛子
龍), Dangshiren Dui Susong Biaodi Zhi Chufenquan Zuowei Xingzheng Susong
34
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Compared with the administrative settlement, in litigation
settlements the government agency does not have to prove that it has
exhausted its ability yet is still unable to acquire sufficient factual or
legal information in order to enter into a litigation settlement with the
counterpart.38 Litigation settlement only occurs during the time the
disputes have been docketed at the court, where the legality and
legitimacy of the agency action have become the subject matter
waiting to be reviewed. In other words, to what extent the
government agency tried to acquire the necessary information would
not then be one of the issues that needs to be scrutinized.
Despite the differences between settlements made at the
government agency investigation stage and those made before the
court, there are still several common elements between them which
will be discussed below.
The Timing of the Settlement
Article 219 paragraph 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act
of Taiwan (TALA) states: “The litigation parties who have the right
to dispose of the subject matter of the action, and when the settlement
does not prejudice the maintenance of the public interest, the
administrative court may, irrespective of the phase of the proceeding
reached, try to settle at any time. A commissioned judge or an
assigned judge is also authorized to do so.” According to the text of
the TALA article, the settlement can be carried out at any time during
the proceedings, regardless of the phases of the case.39 Moreover,
Shang Hejie Zhi Rongxuxing Yaojian (當事人對訴訟標的之處分權作為行政訴
訟上和解之容許性要件) [Litigants’ Disposition Rights over Subject Matters as
an Admissible Element of Reconciliation in Administrative Litigation],
XINGZHENG SUSONG ZHI YANTAO (YI) (行政訴訟之研討(一)) [COMPILATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION SEMINARS (VOL. 1)] 27-28, (Administrative
Litigation Seminar ed., 2012) (arguing that settlements do not waive or lower the
standard of the investigating duty of government agencies).
38
Administrative Litigation Act Art. 219 does not contain the same
conditions as enumerated in Administrative Procedure Act Art. 136.
39
In Germany, it is also commonly believed that despite the jurisdiction
and other procedural errors, litigants still can settle their disputes at a court where
legitimacy is considered controversial. See MARTIN REDEKER, HANS-JOACHIM
VON OERTZEN, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG, 13 Aufl., 2000, §106 Rn. 5
(stating that the settlement process can be concluded at every stage of the
procedure, and it is not necessary that the action be admissible); ERICH
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even if the case has gone through the oral debate process, before the
court has made its final decision, the settlement can still proceed.40
However, the best timing for settlement would be at the beginning
stage of the case, before the court investigates the substantive matters,
and before the parties enter into the discovery stage requiring
investigation of the physical matters or to debate over the sorted
issues. The earlier the parties reach a settlement, the less time and
cost both the court and involved parties may have to spend. If the
parties express a willingness to settle after the final oral argument, the
court must reopen the hearing process so that the case can be returned
back to the trial stage again before the settlement proceedings can
proceed. In German practice, the civil law system where Taiwan’s
legal system originated from, a settlement can still be advanced even
if the court has made its final judgment. In this situation, the
judgment will be lapsed by the settlement. 41 However, such a
situation may not exist in Taiwan’s litigation practice, because once
the court has made a final decision, the case would theoretically be
considered completed and would not be possible to generate any
room to establish a “litigation settlement.”42
As is done in litigation settlement, the government agency
may compromise with the persons before the supposed government
actions have been made43. However, it is still not clear whether the
government agency can settle amid the time the government agency
has made its final action yet the dispute hasn’t been docketed at the
court. According to TAPA article 128, the government agency can
revoke its finished action at any time if it is found to be imperfect
later, therefore, once the government action is abolished by the
EYERMANN, HARALD GEIGER, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG, 14. AUFL.,
2000, §106 Rn. 3, 20. However, in Taiwan some scholars believe that the court
that hears the case should transfer the case to the legitimate one instead of moving
on to the settlement procedure. See CHANG, supra note 32, at 259 (stating that
courts without jurisdiction to hear cases should transfer them to the appropriate
venue rather than proceeding with settlement).
40
Some scholars believe that even during appeal, litigants can still settle
their disputes. See generally CHEN CHI-NAN, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol.
Ⅱ. 297 (2001).
41
REDEKER, VON OERTZEN, supra note 39, at § 106 Rn. 11; EYERMANN,
GEIGER, supra note 39, at § 106 Rn. 11.
42
Chang, supra note 25, at 117.
43
LUO CHUAN XIAN (羅傳賢), XINGZHENG CHENGXU FALUN (行政程序
法論) [TREATISE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT] 245 (2017).
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government agency itself, the situation for settlement may emerge
regardless of whether the dispute has been filed at the court or not.
However, for the prevention of unnecessary suspicion from the public,
it is less likely the government agency would settle with persons in
private before or after the dispute has been filed with the court.44 The
timing of the settlement is a complicated consideration of sensitivity
and wisdom, especially more so for administrative disputes rather
than for civil controversies.
Parties Involved in a Settlement
Since article 219 paragraph 1 of the TALA states that “the
litigation parties . . . try to settle at any time,” all parties who are
involved in the litigation can participate in the settlement process.45
And according to article 23 of the TALA, the so-called litigation
parties refer to the plaintiff, the defendant, and persons who are
permitted by the court to intervene in the proceedings.46 As a result,
the persons who suffered from the agency action, normally the
plaintiff, the government agency who initiated the agency action,
normally the defendant, and those whose interests are affected by the
agency action, normally the intervener, are allowed to participate in
the proceedings of the settlement process.47 As to the possibility of
participation in the settlement proceedings of a third person who is
not a plaintiff, defendant, nor intervener, in accordance with article
219 paragraph 2 of TALA, those who are not litigation parties may
not be able to participate in the settlement proceedings unless it is
deemed necessary by the court, and notifications are served to the

44

Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 128. Since
administrative settlement is conditioned on the basis regulated in TAPA Art. 136
that “[w]here an administrative authority is unable to determine the facts or the
legal relations as the basis for an administrative disposition . . . , it may enter into
a compromise or an administrative contract with a citizen in lieu of administrative
disposition . . . ” (emphasis added) it would be pretty peculiar for the government
agency to abolish its previous action which was made based on the determined
facts and legal relations in exchange for entering into a settlement with the citizen
before the administrative dispute is filed with the court. Id. Art. 136.
45
Id. Art. 129.
46
Id. Art. 23.
47
See CHANG, supra note 32, at 254–57 (explaining how parties can
participate in the settlement process to seek for remedies).
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third party accordingly.48 In addition, if the settlement proceedings
are handled by the attorneys, a specific extra authorization of that
power of the attorneys is required by law before they can actually
handle the settlement proceedings on behalf of the parties.49
Compared with litigation settlement, the government agency
in accordance with the law does not have to notify any person who is
not supposed to be issued an agency action, nor the persons whose
rights might not be directly affected, in order to complete the
administrative settlement.50 One major reason for this is because an
administrative settlement normally occurs early before the
government agency has made its action. At this stage, the disputes
only exist between the government agency and the person to which
the agency action is likely to be issued. Since the agency action
hasn’t yet been issued, those who are going to be indirectly affected
by the not yet existing agency action would then have no standing to
participate in the administrative settlement, and the government
agency does not have to notify any indirectly affected person to
participate in the administrative settlement either.51
However, it is still unclear as to what is considered a relevant
connection to the disputes a person should have in order to qualify
them to intervene in litigation. No clear rule or standard of relevancy
has the court expressed for persons to take a self-review of the
possibility of participation of litigation in advance. It is subject to the
court’s discretion whether to permit any third party to intervene in
litigation on a case by case basis.52 Depth of the involvement of the
dispute or the scale of the influence to the third person constitutes the
48

Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219.
Art. 51 ¶ 1 of TALA states that “[t]he trial attorney shall have the right
to act in all litigation on the matter of their appointment. However, rejection,
acceptance, withdrawal, settlement, counterclaim, appeal or retrial, and the
appointment of an agent cannot be done without special authorization.”
Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 51.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Bo Kang Bao Co., v. New Taipei City Govern., Zuigao
Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Sup. Admin. Court], 108 Niandu Panzi No.
108 (108 年度判字第 108 號判決) (2019) (Taiwan) (“而所謂利害關係乃指法律
上之利害關係，應就法律保護對象及規範目的等因素為綜合判斷” [the socalled “interest” [of a third party] refers to the legal interest, which should be
integrally determined in accordance with factors such as the object of legal
protection and the purpose of regulation]).
49
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factors for the court to make its decision. Nevertheless, dissension
over relevancy to the litigation between court and third parties isn’t
uncommon.
The Person Involved in the Settlement Must Have the Power of
Disposition Over the Subject Matter
First of all, it must be clarified what is the “subject matter” of
a litigation. The definition of the subject matter of litigation in
Taiwan is widely divided,53 but the so-called subject matter of the
litigation settlement here refers to the content or condition of mutual
concessions promised by the parties, or the content of the acts that the
parties agree to do or not to do. 54 The parties involved in the
settlement proceedings must have the final discretion ability over the
conditions or content of the settlement, which is referred to as the
power of disposition or right of disposal.55 This rule applies to both
administrative and litigation settlement.56 If the final decision is up
to another person who is not involved in the settlement proceedings,
or the negotiating parties do not have right to dispose of the disputed
matters, the content of the settlement then contains no binding power
to the third persons and the outcome of the settlement will be of no
adjudicative value.57

53

See Chang Wunyu (張文郁), Xingzheng Susong Zhong Chexiao
Susong Zhi Susong Biaodi Zhi Yanjiu (行政訴訟中撤銷訴訟之訴訟標的之研究)
[A Study on the Subject Matter of Action for Cassation], 32 FUREN FAXUE (輔仁
法學) [FU JEN L. J.] 45 (2006) (illustrating diversified interpretations regarding
“subject matter”).
54
As to private persons, the right of disposition of subject matters refers
to the personal right that can be resorted to administrative remedies. Rights
obtained from the reflection of government agency action, policy, or those of
public realm shall not be included. See Sheng, supra note 37, at 11 (explaining
the meaning of “subject matter” in the context of mutual concessions).
55
See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1559.
56
Id.
57
However, this kind of settlement can be considered a settlement
outside the litigation, which still contains civil binding power among litigants.
See id. at 21 (explaining an approach to settlement adopted in German
jurisdiction).
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Settlement Must Be a Concession Among Litigants Involved58
The purpose of the settlement in an administrative litigation
is to replace the original government agency action with the condition
reached in the settlement, therefore, the content of the settlement
theoretically should be more favorable or acceptable for the person
who received the government agency action, and relatively, the
government agency must to some extent waive part of the
requirements or restrictions listed in the original agency action to a
lighter degree for that person. 59 If the parties insist on their own
views or interests and are unwilling to give in to each other, that is,
there is no possibility of a settlement, at which situation the court will
have to give its final decision instead of attempting to achieve a
settlement.60
The Outcome of Reconciliation Must Be Harmless to the Public
Interest
As mentioned above, settlement can only be achieved by
mutual concession from both parties; each side must to some extent
waive part of his or her most favorable expectation in order to replace
the original government agency action with a more favorable result.
And, since government agencies are supposed to maintain and secure
social order in every aspect, it may be controversial should
government agencies retreat and compromise with a person who was
supposed to be sanctioned or disciplined. In other words, can social
order or public interest be sacrificed for or bargained away by
authorities?
To answer that question, one should refer to the terminology
of the law. The legal term stated in article 219 of the TALA is “no
barrier to the maintenance of the public interest” instead of “good for
the maintenance of the public interest.” 61 Therefore, the plain
interpretation of the legal language shall be that the settlement does
not need to generate any benefits to the public interest, and as long as
58

Id. at 33–34.
See Chang, supra note 25, at 122 (elaborating on the purpose of
settlement in an administrative litigation).
60
See CHANG, supra note 32, at 262 (explaining the concept of “mutual
concessions”).
61
Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 2, Art. 219.
59
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the public interest can still be maintained, reconciliation proceedings
may still be undergone.62 In addition, the interpretation of so-called
“public interest” is based on the scale of overall benefits of the
nation,63 rather than on the interests of specific groups or industries64.
If the outcome of reconciliation is beneficial to the country as a whole,
even if it is unfavorable to some groups or industries, it should still
be considered unhindered to the maintenance of the public interest.65
The court must conduct a judicial review of whether there is a conflict
between the content of the settlement and the maintenance of the
public interest, and if the conclusion of the review is that the
settlement is detrimental to the maintenance of the public interest,
then the court shall not grant it, or intervene to adjust the conditions
of the settlement when necessary, even if the new conditions must
slightly vary from the original. 66 However, if the conditions of
settlement altered are conducive to the maintenance of the public
interest, but one of the parties is unwilling to accept it, since
settlement is a mutual concession agreed upon by the litigants
involved, even if one of the parties expressed a desire to settle, the
court still cannot force the party who disagreed to enter into the
reconciliation proceedings. Therefore, at this time the reconciliation
proceedings should be considered not feasible.
62

See LIOU & PENG, supra note 31 (arguing that settlements are not
bound to addressing public interest).
63
There is no clear definition of “public interest” either regulated by
laws or interpreted by court rulings, and the term may vary in appearance as
“reasonable,” “adequate,” “necessary,” “practicable,” “feasible,” or “suitable,” or
combinations of them. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §196.37(1) (West 1957)
(illustrating that different terms are used to define “public interest”); Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §15(4) (1970) (using, but not defining, the term
“public interest”).
64
Qiu Congzhi (邱聰智), Sifa shang Gonggong Liyi de Gainian yu
Shiyong (私法上公共利益的概念與適用) [The Concept and Application of
Public Interest in Private Law], 13 ZHONGHUA FAXUE (中華法學) [Chinese Soc’y
L. J.] 9 (2009) (illustrating the attribution of “public interests”).
65
Id. at 12.
66
See LIOU & PENG, supra note 31, at 495 (explaining how the court can
conduct a judicial review to check if a settlement is in compliance with public
interest). In fact, it is quite difficult for the reviewing court to determine whether
the government agency has properly balanced public interest with private benefits
when the agency has decided to enter into the commitment to the settlement,
especially when the conflicting interests are equally strong against each other.
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The Outcome of Settlement is Equivalent to that of a Judgment
From a procedural point of view, when a settlement occurs,
the case closes, and the parties are no longer in a litigation
relationship. From a substantive point of view, once the parties have
reached a settlement in litigation, the case’s issues are generally
resolved through judicial proceedings, and the settlement’s effect is
equivalent to a court decision. 67 Furthermore, the settlement’s
conditions will replace the original government action unless there
are grounds for revocation, at which point the parties may request a
continuation of the trial.68 Otherwise, the settlement’s outcome is
akin to a court judgment.69 In a latter case related to a settled case’s
subject matter, the court may not make a judgment that is different
from the settlement outcome.70 Further, any involved litigants cannot
take another legal action against the other party for the same cause
afterwards.71 However, the content of the settlement will only be
effective between or among parties bound by settlement. 72 The
settlement does not bind those who did not participate. 73 If the
settlement is later found to be null, void, or containing rescindable
flaws, the parties may request that the court continue the trial within
30 days of the settlement date74 . If the court determines that the

67
TALA Art. 213 regulates that “[the] subject matter of the litigation
refereed in the final judgment contains determined effectiveness.” According to
Art. 222, Art. 213 is mutatis mutandis applicable to litigation settlement.
Administrative Legislation Act, supra note 14, Arts. 213, 222.
68
Id. Art. 223.
69
See e.g., SHENG, supra note 37, at 34 (demonstrating that some
scholars, however, consider litigation settlement an expedient measure that should
not be an equivalent to court judgments).
70
CHEN, supra note 24, at 575.
71
Administrative Litigation Act Art. 222 stipulates that: “Where the
settlement is established, its effect shall be governed by Article 223, Article 214
and Article 226,” whereas Art. 214 ¶ 1 states: “In addition to the parties, a final
judgment is also effective for those who are the successors of the parties in the
litigation and those who occupy the subject matter of the request for the parties or
their successors.”
72
Chang, supra note 25, at 131.
73
Id.
74
Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, at Art. 224 ¶ 1.
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settlement proceedings indeed possess flaws, the settlement may be
withdrawn and trial proceedings may continue.75
One interesting question is whether the settlement
proceedings can resume once the trail proceedings continue? The law
accounts for the continuation of the trial proceedings but does not
explicitly prohibit further settlement proceedings. It therefore
follows that the court and the parties could once again resume
settlement proceedings to obtain a new, valid settlement.

III.

QUALCOMM V. TFTC

Qualcomm has a leading advantage in CDMA, WCDMA, and
LTE technologies, 76 as well as a quasi-monopoly over chips for
mobile devices in the Taiwanese market 77 . Qualcomm possesses
quite a few patents, some of which are recognized as StandardEssential Patents (SEPs).78 For seven consecutive years, Qualcomm
operated unfairly in several ways, not only to its competitors but also
to its business partners. Among other things, the company (1) refused
to license its products to its competitors, with or without additional
restrictions; (2) refused to provide chips to those who had not yet

75

Administrative Litigation Act Art. 223 stipulates that: “If there are
reasons for invalidity or revocation of the settlement, the parties may request that
the trial be continued. ” Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14.
76
Cong Zhuanye Jishu Buju Lai Kan Gaotong Tongxin Jingpian
Shichang Duzhan Diwei (從專利技術布局來看 高通通信晶片市場獨占地位)
[Current Patent Distribution Landscape Highlights Qualcomm’s Sole
Dominance in the Communication Chip Market], INNOVATION KNOWLEDGE
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=13321.
77
Id.
78
A Standard-Essential Patent claims an invention which must be used
to conform to a standard. As explained in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No.
C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, ¶ 53 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), “A given
patent is ‘essential’ to a standard if the use of the standard requires infringement
of the patent, even if acceptable alternatives of that patent could have been written
into the standard.” See also Mark A. Lemley, Intell. Prop. Rights and StandardSetting Orgs., 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (detailing how standard-setting
organizations, such as Qualcomm, respond to assertions of IP rights when
licensing their patents).
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licensed a Qualcomm patent; and (3) provided rebates that created
exclusive supply arrangements.79
The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), the sole
competent authority of the Fair Trade Act, is responsible for
maintaining free and fair market competition, safeguarding the
interests of consumers, and promoting economic stability and
prosperity. 80 The Commission possesses the authority to sanction
businesses that violate the Fair Trade Act, such as concerted action
or directly or indirectly prevent any other enterprises from competing
by unfair means .81
Responding to public reports of trade violations,82 the TFTC
initiated an investigation into Qualcomm in 2015, involving more
than 20 domestic and foreign mobile phone manufacturers (including
brand manufacturers and OEMs), along with chip suppliers and
communications equipment operators.83 In October 2017, the TFTC
concluded that Qualcomm’s restrictive patent licensing policy in the
mobile device chip market constituted competition restrictions that

79
Qualcomm conducted its business model similarly in many territories.
For more details, see District Court Decision in FTC v. Qualcomm Spawns
Controversy: Four Issues to Watch on Appeal, CROWELL MORING (Jun. 3, 2019),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/District-CourtDecision-in-FTC-v-Qualcomm-Spawns-Controversy-Four-Issues-to-Watch-onAppeal [https://perma.cc/JN2P-RVMQ].
80
Gongping Jiaoyi Fa (公平交易法) [Fair Trade Act] (promulgated by
Fair Trade Commission, Feb. 4, 1991, amended Jun. 14, 2017) (Taiwan), Art. 1,
FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of
the Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0150002
[https://perma.cc/F83E-DWRG] [hereinafter Fair Trade Act].
81
Organization and Duties, FAIR TRADE COMM’N (Taiwan),
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=198&docid=121
93 [https://perma.cc/AUL7-PU82] (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:28 PM).
82
There were two public reports in total, one of which was later
withdrawn. See Gongping Jiaoyi Weiyuanhui Chufen Shu (公平交易委員會處
分書) [Fair Trade Commission Sanctions], No. 106094, (2017) (Taiwan),
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/561633e4-42bd-4a4f-a679c5ae5226966b.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXN6-J4TJ].
83
Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/2

448

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

violated Article 9, Section 1 of the Fair Trade Act. 84 Qualcomm
subsequently faced a NT$23.4 billion ($733 million) fine, and was
required to: (1) cease enforcing a contract clause, signed with chip
competitors, that compelled them to provide sensitive distribution
information such as chip price, sales counterparts, sale quantities, and
product models; (2) cease its moratorium on providing chips to those
who refused to license Qualcomm patents; (3) stop rebating specific
companies in exchange for exclusive supply arrangements. 85
Qualcomm paid part of the fine and filed an administrative lawsuit
with the Intellectual Property Court (“IP Court”) against the TFTC’s
ruling86.
Jurisdiction
According to Article 4, Paragraph 1 of TALA, “people whose
legal rights or interests are infracted by illegal actions of the central
or local authorities. . . may bring a lawsuit before the jurisdictional
Administrative Court for a cassation judgment against the authorities
who made the adverse actions.”87 In addition, Article 48, Paragraph
1 of the Fair Trade Act also provides that “[where] disposition or
decisions made by the competent authority pursuant to this Act are
objected or challenged, the procedures for administrative litigation
shall apply directly.” 88 The TFTC is an independent government
agency89 under the Executive Yuan (the highest executive branch in
84

Fair Trade Act Art. 9 stipulates that Monopolistic enterprises shall
not engage in any one of the following conducts: (1) directly or indirectly
prevent any other enterprises from competing by unfair means; (2) improperly
set, maintain or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services; (3)
make a trading counterpart give preferential treatment without justification; or
(4) other abusive conducts by its market power. Fair Trade Act, supra note 80.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art.4.
88
Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 48.
89
“Independent agency” means “a commission-type collegial
organization that exercises its powers and functions independently without the
supervision of other agencies, and operates autonomously unless otherwise
stipulated.” Zhongyang Xingzheng Jiguan Zuzhi Jizhunfa (中央行政機關組織基
準法) [Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations],
(promulgated by Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, Executive
Yuan, June. 23, 2004, amended Feb. 3, 2010) (Taiwan), Art. 3.2, FAWUBU FAGUI
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Taiwan), which, in accordance with Article 2 of the Fair Trade Act,
has the authority to investigate and dispose of cases concerning Fair
Trade Act violations.90 Therefore, the sanction made by TFTC to
Qualcomm is an agency action in nature, meaning any appeals
undergo judicial review by the Taipei Administrative High Court.91
According to the reminders listed at the end of the TFTC’s ruling,
Qualcomm was informed to bring any appeals to the Taipei
Administrative High Court. However, instead of suing in the Taipei
Administrative High Court, Qualcomm sued the TFTC in the IP
Court, a specialized court which has jurisdiction over intellectual
property disputes, including relevant criminal, civil, and
administrative disputes.92 Early in litigation, both parties had a minor
dispute as to which court held jurisdiction.93 The TFTC insisted that
the Taipei Administrative High Court was the legitimate forum, and
Qualcomm argued that the IP Court has an overlapping jurisdiction
over the subject matter.94
The IP Court was established in 2008 to respond to the urgent
need of a specialized court for the vigorous development in the
technology industries of Taiwan.95 For decades, Taiwan has ranked
as one of the most innovative countries in the world, especially in

ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of
China], https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0010036
[https://perma.cc/7MTB-HFK4].
90
Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 2.
91
See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art.13 (stating that
“The lawsuits of public legal persons shall be under the jurisdiction of the
administrative court where the official office is located. When the organization of
a public legal person is the defendant, it shall be under the jurisdiction of the
administrative court where the organization is located.”). As the TFTC is located
in Taipei City, any administrative complaint against the TFTC should be subject
to the Taipei Administrative High Court’s review.
92
Intellectual Property Court Organization Act, infra note 95, at Art. 3,
¶1.
93
This information is confidential trial material and not publicly
available.
94
This information is confidential trial material and not publicly
available.
95
See IPC—Creativity, Professionalism and Justice, INTELL. PROP. CT.
(Dec. 15, 2020) (Taiwan), https://ipc.judicial.gov.tw/en/cp-677-4143-67051092.html [https://perma.cc/K7W8-FPTU] (describing the function and
establishment of Intellectual Property Court in Taiwan).
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technology. 96 Taiwan’s quantity of patent applications in world
major markets has long been standing in the first tier when compared
with other competitors. 97 In order to meet the demand from
technology industries, both domestic and overseas, the IP Court is
designed to consist of well-trained senior judges and well
experienced technical examination officers mainly borrowed from
the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office on a three year tenure,98 with
which to ensure trials can be done with fewer technical errors through
the cooperation of legal and technical experts.99 According to the
Intellectual Property Court Organization Act (the enabling act of the
court) article 3 paragraph 1 subparagraph 3, the IP Court has the
jurisdiction of “[f]irst instance over administrative actions and
compulsory enforcement actions concerning intellectual property
rights arising under the Patent Act, Trademark Act, Copyright Act,
Optical Disk Act, Regulations Governing the Protection of Integrated
Circuits Configuration, Species of Plants and Seedling Act, or Fair
96

Kate Whiting, These Are the World's 10 Most Innovative Economies,
WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/these-are-the-worlds-10-mostinnovative-economies; Taiwan's Economy Ranks 5th in Innovation Potential,
TAIWAN NEWS (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4031377.
97
See World Intellectual Property Indicators, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Intellectual_Property_Indicators#Taiwanese
_Patents (note that statistics about Taiwan are normally merged with that of
China) (last accessed May 19, 2021).
98
See Zhihui Caichan Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (智慧財產法院組織法)
[Intellectual Property Court Organization Act] (promulgated by Presidential
Order Hwa-Tzong-1-Yi-Tze No. 09600035701, Mar. 28, 2007, amended and
promulgated June 4, 2014) (Taiwan), Art. 16, SIFA YUAN (司法院) [JUDICIAL
YUAN],
https://www.tiplo.com.tw/files/Intellectual_Property_Court_Organization_Act_20
14-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSE7-J7S5] [hereinafter Intellectual Property Court
Organization Act) (stating that a Technical Examination Officer of the IP Court
shall have at least master degree or above from a graduate school, and have
served as a Patent Examiner or Trademark Examiner or Assistant Examiner for
over six years in total with good track record, or have been a lecturer of a
university for six years in total, or an assistant professor, associate professor, or
professor for over three years in total, etc.).
99
See generally Related Laws & Regulations, INTELL. PROP. CT. (Dec.
15, 2020) (Taiwan), https://ipc.judicial.gov.tw/en/cp-688-4220-2a286-092.html
[https://perma.cc/2TJQ-5X2Q] (stating the laws and regulations regarding the
technical examination officer).
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Trade Act.”100 As the TFTC imposition of penalty upon Qualcomm
was for the improper patent licensing activities of Qualcomm, and as
the patent is an intellectual property right, in theory the IP Court shall
have jurisdiction over the TFTC disputed administrative agency
action in this case. Since the IP Court Organization Act has so
illustrated, the IP Court then agreed with Qualcomm’s argument that
the Court has the jurisdiction over the case since it is an IP related fair
trade dispute.101 The TFTC then withdrew its contrary argument.102
Intervention in Litigation
After the case was docketed with the IP Court, a total of six
companies, including Apple Inc., and Intel etc., requested to
intervene on the lawsuit,103 asserting that their legal rights or interests
would have been affected by the result of the litigation. These
companies all directly or indirectly have business with Qualcomm
and claimed to have suffered from Qualcomm’s unfair licensing
100

¶1.

101

Intellectual Property Court Organization Act, supra note 98, Art. 3,

Id.
See Minshi Susong Fa (民事訴訟法) [Taiwan Code of Civil
Procedure] (promulgated by Presidential Order Hwa-Tzong-1-Yi-Tze No.
11000004871, Feb. 1, 1935, amended Nov. 28, 2018), Arts. 24, 25, FAWUBU
FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [LAWS AND REGULATIONS DATABASE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0010001
[https://perma.cc/H9R8-T93F] (stating in Art. 24 ¶ 1 that “[p]arties may, by
agreement, designate a court of first instance to exercise jurisdiction, provided
that such agreement relates to a particular legal relation[,]” and stating in Art. 25
that “[a] court obtains jurisdiction over an action where the defendant proceeds
orally on the merits without contesting lack of jurisdiction[,]” which make it
possible for a court to obtain jurisdiction that was previously considered absent.
However, the above mentioned articles are not applicable mutatis mutandis in
administrative litigation).
103
See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., Zhihui Caichan Fayuan (智慧財產法
院) [Intell. Prop. Ct.], Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling], 106 Xing
Gongsu No. 1 (106 年度行公訴字第 1 號裁定) (2017) (Taiwan), at 1–3,
https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ty=JD&id=IPCA,106%2c%e8%a1%8
c%e5%85%ac%e8%a8%b4%2c1%2c20180808%2c3 [https://perma.cc/M78KTR5D] (showing that six companies, including Apple Inc. and Intel Corporation,
petitioned to intervene on Qualcomm Inc.’s lawsuit with the Fair Trade
Commission).
102
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policy, from which has caused different scales of damages for each
of these companies, and hence made them qualified to intervene in
the litigation.104 According to article 42 paragraph 1 of the TALA, if
the Administrative Court finds that the outcome of the litigation
proceedings may impair the rights or legal interests of a third party,
the court may, ex officio, at the request of the third person, allow them
to take part in the litigation proceedings independently.105 Thus, any
third party, even government agencies,106 may apply to the court to
participate in the litigation proceedings provided that they can prove
to the court what interests they have in the proceedings and how their
rights or legal interests may suffer, however, the court has the
discretion of whether to grant it or not.107 In similar situations, where
the court considers that the rights or legal interests of a third party are
likely to be affected by the outcome of the settlement proceedings,
the court may, under its discretion, notify the third party to intervene
in the settlement proceedings independently. 108 The purpose of the
admission for a third party to participate in the proceedings is to
resolve all disputes in one procedure in order to save the costs of
litigation and avoid creating any contradiction among parallel or
subsequent cases.109
104
Information based on the parties’ petition to intervene and not
publicly available.
105
Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 42, ¶ 1.
106
See Xingzheng Susong Fa (行政訴訟法) [Admin. Litig. Act]
(promulgated by the Government, Nov. 17, 1932, amended Jan. 15, 2020)
(Taiwan), Art. 44, FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [LAWS AND
REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=a0030154
[perma.cc/748F-9XVT] (stipulating in ¶ 1 that “[i]f the administrative court
believes that other administrative agencies are necessary to assist one of the
parties, it may order them to participate in the litigation[,]” and stating in ¶ 2 that
“[t]he administrative agencies or interested third parties in the preceding
paragraph may also petition to participate”).
107
CHANG WUN-YU (張文郁), Quanli Yu Jiuji San, Shiti Yu Chengxu Zhi
Jiaocuo ( 權 利 與 救 濟 ( 三 ) 實 體 與 程 序 之 交 錯 ) [Rights and Remedies (III),
Interleaving of Substantiality and Procedure], at 257 (2014).
108
Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2.
109
See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1429 (stating that the legislative purpose
of admitting a third party to intervene is mainly to protect such third party’s
interests, clarify the facts of the lawsuit, and save the costs of litigation by
enhancing the effectiveness of the adjudication).
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Another important reason for the notification of a third party
to intervene on the litigation is to protect the rights of the affected
third party,110 so that they would have the opportunity to state their
opinions to the court. Once the third party has been notified to
participate in the proceedings, with or without his attendance, the
outcome of the judgment in accordance with the law will have
binding power on the notified participants.111 As mentioned above,
the third party whose rights are affected, in accordance with the law,
may apply to the court to participate not only in the trial proceedings,
but also in the settlement proceedings. 112 The major difference
between participation in settlement and participation in litigation is
that in the trial proceedings, the court may ex officio actively notify
a third party to participate, while in the settlement proceedings, the
court will not ex officio actively notify the third party to participate,
and the third party must acquire the court’s permission to participate,
on which the court has the final decision whether to allow or not.113
The main consideration in the court’s decision on whether to allow a
third party to participate in the conciliation proceedings is
necessity. 114 Since administrative litigation settlement is an
alternative solution between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
outcome of the settlement may eventually supersede the original
adjudication made by the government agency, or even the court’s
judgment. Therefore, the willingness of the plaintiff and the
defendant will be the major concern, and whether or not the
110
See id. at 1431 (stating that if a third party’s rights or legal interests
will be negatively impacted by the result of the lawsuit, the court shall ex officio
order such third party to participate in the lawsuit independently, and permit such
third party to participate in the lawsuit according to such third party’s petition).
111
See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 47 (stating that
“[i]n accordance with the provisions of articles 41 and 42, the judgment is valid
not only to those who have been ordered by the administrative court to participate
in the trial proceeding but also to those who received the order but failed to
participate”).
112
Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2.
113
See CHEN, supra note 29, at 1429 (explaining that when the third
persons or affected persons contain a co-party status in nature with one of the
litigants, the notification to intervene in the litigation becomes mandatory).
114
See Chang, supra note 25, at 119 (explaining that the main reason
why a third party is not considered necessary to intervene in a settlement
proceeding is because the lack of disputed issues need to be adjudicated in a
litigation together with litigants).
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participation of a third party is helpful to the achievement of the
settlement conditions will be the most important factor that the court
has to consider. Thus, the law confers that the court has the discretion
on the third party’s request to participate in the settlement
proceedings.115 Should the court find the third party’s participation
in the settlement is not necessary, or likely to create hurdles for the
achievement of the settlement, the court may deny the application.
The IP Court ultimately refused Apple and others’ request to
participate in the proceedings. 116 The main reason is that the
imposition of the TFTC’s sanction upon Qualcomm is based on the
evidence collected from the independent investigation initiated by the
TFTC for the purpose of securing competing market order, not for the
benefit of Apple et al. 117 Even though some of them reported
Qualcomm’s improper behavior to the TFTC, requesting it to initiate
an investigation procedure, it still rested on the TFTC’s discretion
whether or not to investigate or even impose sanction upon
Qualcomm. As the Supreme Administrative Court previously opined:
The petitioner is not the recipient of the government
agency action. Though they did report the case, which
only prompted the TFTC to initiate the investigation,
the petitioner does not have any right to claim in
accordance with public law. Petitioner stated that . . .
if the agency sanction is revoked, it will enable Philips
to continue to commit illegal acts, abuse patent rights,
and expose the petitioner to long-term threats of
litigation from Philips. However, the influenced part
of petitioner is only the economic or other de facto
benefits, which is not sufficient to prove that his rights
or legal interests will be damaged by the result of this
lawsuit. Therefore the petitioner’s requisition to
participate in this lawsuit is inconsistent with the

115

Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14, Art. 219 ¶ 2.
See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., supra note 103, at 3 (refusing
petitioners’ request to participate in the lawsuit).
117
Id.
116
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above mentioned regulations and precedents. The
petition is thus denied.118
Similarly, the agency action made by the TFTC should not in
any way be considered a response to those who reported Qualcomm’s
improper behavior. As Qualcomm is the only one who suffered from
TFTC’s sanction directly, not Apple et al, and the benefits or
detriments Apple et al enjoyed or suffered are only the reflection from
the government agency action, so as to the related industries. 119
Therefore, it is groundless for Apple and others to participate in the
proceedings.120
In response to the negative decision of the IP Court, Mediatek
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, iterating that the
sanction against Qualcomm substantially affected its competition
ability in the market, hence qualified it to participate in the
litigation. 121 However, the appeal was ultimately rejected by the
Supreme Administrative Court. 122 The Supreme Administrative
Court did not explain whether or not Mediatek would have been
affected by TFTC’s ruling, instead, the Supreme Administrative

118

Petitioner Princo Co., Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院)
[Sup. Admin. Ct.], Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling], 99 Cai
Sheng No. 87 (99 年裁聲字第 87 號裁定) (2010) (Taiwan),
https://law.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/data.aspx?ty=JD&id=TPAA,99%2c%e8%a3%8
1%e8%81%b2%2c87%2c20100909%2c1 [https://perma.cc/C2FE-77KB].
119
See Petitioner Apple Inc., et al., supra note 103.
120
Regarding participation in litigation, one should prove to the court the
interest sought to be protected is within the zone of interests guaranteed by the
statute, and the causation and redressability between their adversely affected
interest and the agency action. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
563 (1992) (“[I]t becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that
those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation
and permit redressability of injury.”).
121
This information is based on the petitioner’s paper and not available
to public.
122
Zuigao Xinzheng Fayuan (最高行政法院) [Sup. Admin. Ct.],
Xingzheng Caiding (行政裁定) [Admin. Ruling],107 Cai No. 2040 (107年度裁
字第2040號裁定) (2019) (Taiwan).
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Court considered that there was no ground or necessity for Mediatek
to participate in a case which has already been closed.123
Willingness to Reconcile
After Qualcomm had filed a legal action against the TFTC,
during the preliminary proceedings, the IP Court, in accordance with
TALA article 219 paragraphs 1, inquired of Qualcomm and the TFTC
about their willingness for settlement. Qualcomm expressed to the
court its willingness to communicate further in depth with the
TFTC, 124 and if possible, Qualcomm was willing to reach a
settlement with the TFTC. Similarly, the TFTC attorney affirmed to
convey Qualcomm’s opinions to the TFTC committee for further
discussion. Since Qualcomm and the TFTC both illustrated their
willingness to communicate with each other, the court then requested
that the two parties should negotiate with each other within a certain
period of time and report the outcome of the communication to the
court. After a period of four months of negotiation back and forth
between the two sides, Qualcomm and the TFTC eventually reached
an agreement and reported the conclusion of the negotiation to the
court accordingly.
Conditions of Reconciliation
Qualcomm’s settlement with the TFTC is divided into two
parts, one of which is conditions both sides agreed to be disclosed to
the public, and the other is to be kept confidential at the request of
both parties. 125 In accordance with a press release issued by
Qualcomm and the TFTC, Qualcomm committed to the following
matters: (a) Qualcomm will renegotiate in good faith with domestic
mobile phone manufacturers and chip suppliers, continue to provide
123

Supreme Administrative Court states: “The existence of a trial case at
the court premises the intervention of a third party, if the trial case has separated
from the court, then there is no ground for any third party to intervene.”
124
According to the press release issued by TFTC, Qualcomm expressed
its wiliness of settlement with TFTC to the Court. See Gongping Jiaoyi
Weiyuanhui Xinwen Ziliao (公平交易委員會新聞資料) [TFTC Press Release
Material], TFTC (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/b5140eaa-99e446b3-a9f4-a65273bdcb67.pdf [https://perma.cc/L78T-7T84].
125
This information is confidential court file not available to public.
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chips in accordance with FRAND 126 requirement during the time
period of negotiation, and cease taking further legal actions or
withdraw from all pending legal cases; (b) Qualcomm has an
obligation to report to the TFTC not only the implementation
situation of the agreement on a frequency of once every six months
for a period of five years but also the situation of any newly signed
or revised contracts with domestic mobile phone manufacturers or
chip suppliers within 30 days whenever the contracts have been
signed; (c) Qualcomm agreed not to dispute the $88 million NTD fine
it had paid and promised to undertake a five-year industrial
investment program in Taiwan (investments including 5G
cooperation, new market expansion, cooperation with start-ups and
universities, and the establishment of a Taiwan based operations and
manufacturing engineering center).127
The above-mentioned settlement conditions rely on
Qualcomm’s sincerity and willingness to perform, in order to
guarantee Qualcomm would realize the conditions in accordance with
the terms of the settlement, one of the proposals suggested that
Qualcomm should be required to submit a very substantial deposit,
which will not be returned until Qualcomm has actually fulfilled its
obligations in accordance with the settlement conditions.128 In the
end, however, this suggestion was not adopted, but alternatively,
Qualcomm had to regularly report to the TFTC its progress in
implementing the terms of the settlement.129

126

FRAND stands for fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing
policy. It is a promise committed by the right holder (normally the patent right
holders, especially those of SEPs) to industry standard-setting organizations
(“SSOs”) in exchange for the recognition of a universal standard of its innovation.
SEP right holders may constitute patent right misuse or abuse if they violate the
FRAND agreement in licensing business later. See Case C-170/13 Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.J., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477
(explaining the meaning of FRAND and how the term works).
127
For details of the conditions, see FTC News Release, FAIR TRADE
COMM’N (Aug. 10, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=179&docid=155
65 [https://perma.cc/D9JD-5SEE] (last visited May 28, 2021) (introducing the
conditions Qualcomm agreed to undertake).
128
TFTC commissioner opinions are recorded in TFTC file and not
available for non-trial use.
129
Id.
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Factors Considered by the Court
In the settlement proceedings, Qualcomm agreed to
renegotiate the terms of the license in good faith with the mobile
phone manufacturers and to grant SEP license on a FRAND basis for
mobile communications standards, while not supplying only chips
during the renegotiation; for the chip supplier portion, Qualcomm
undertook not to bring any action against the chip suppliers without
first filing a license clause based on the principle of fairness,
reasonableness, and non-discrimination clauses with the chip
suppliers regarding the necessary patents for mobile communication
standards.130 And if Qualcomm signs an exhausted authorization of
chips for the necessary patents for mobile communication standards
or grants a third person non-claim of rights, Qualcomm will provide
the same conditions to the chip suppliers.131 In addition to making
these commitments and agreeing to end unfair competition in patent
licensing, Qualcomm has also committed to establishing test centers
in Taiwan,132 help improve 5G technology and product development,
and assist Taiwan manufacturers to expand global markets.133 The IP
Court, after having considered all factors, listening to the statements
from both sides, including the information of vigorous development
of Taiwan’s mobile communications technology, the momentum that
could be generated through the cooperation of domestic and foreign
experts and the benefits which could be created therefrom, granted
Qualcomm’s settlement with the TFTC to complete the litigation
settlement process. 134 Aforementioned considerations helped
encourage the court to make its final decision.
One should bear in mind that the promises Qualcomm
committed in the settlement should in no way be deemed as an
atonement for its past mistakes nor a free ticket for its future possible
130

Id.
Id.
132
The new building of the research and test center has broken ground in
June 2019 in Xin Zhu. Gaotong Xieshou Taichang Qianggong 5G, Xindalou
Donggong (高通携手台厂抢攻 5G，新大楼动工) [Qualcomm Joins Hands with
Taiwanese Factories to Break Ground on New 5G Building], LIBERTY TIMES NET
(June 28, 2019), https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1299105
[https://perma.cc/J8HG-2JL3 (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
133
See FTC News Release, supra note 127.
134
Id.
131
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fault, Qualcomm would be punished again should it fail to fulfill its
duty in accordance with the conditions listed in the settlement or
should it commit further improper activities in the future.135

IV.

CRITICISMS

The TFTC’s Consent to Settlement Violates its Duty
Most of the criticism of the settlement agreement focused on
the TFTC’s end of the agreement.136 An example of a criticism levied
at the TFTC was why it believed that Qualcomm’s commitment to
future investments in Taiwan’s 5G industries along with other
promises would make up for damages caused by its improper
licensing policy?137
Before answering that question, one should understand that
deciding whether to prosecute or enforce an agency’s decision is
entirely subjected to the agency’s discretion. 138 When making a
decision, each government agency, regardless of its dependency,
must go through a formal procedure in order for it to reach a
conclusion, regardless of whether the agency is a committee system
or a purely single head system.139 The totality of the procedure thus
constitutes the mechanism of decision making, through which
legitimacy and legality of government agency action will become
primary issues for judicial review when dispute arise later.
Throughout several rounds of negotiation during settlement
135
Id. In according to the principle of res judicata, newly happened
incident will not be precluded by the former judgment; therefore, Qualcomm will
be subject to another punishment if it does commit another improper business
activity after the settlement. See Administrative Litigation Act, supra note 14,
Art. 107 ¶ 1 (9).
136
See Liu Kung-Chung, From Not Prepared to Handle, Unable to
Handle, to Unwilling to Handle the Issue of Standard Essential Patent FRAND
Authorization, 296 TAIWAN L. REV. 173, 181−88 (2020) (criticizing the TFTC for
reaching a settlement with Qualcomm).
137
Id.
138
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”)
139
See Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act, Arts. 102–09 (2002)
(laying out the procedural rights the subject of an administrative disposition has to
state a statement of opinion and hearing).
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proceedings, Qualcomm proposed various sets of commitments it
could possibly make. 140 Pros and cons of every proposed
commitment was analyzed and debated in depth by both sides. 141
Before the TFTC made its final decision, the contents of the
settlement agreement were scrutinized by the committee members.
While the TFTC committee’s vote in favor of a settlement agreement
was close, 142 it does not imply that the TFTC’s approval of the
settlement was reckless or arbitrary.
One criticism of the TFTC argues that, as an independent
organization,143 the TFTC is supposed to protect the domestic market,
secure the interests of consumers and ensure free and fair
competition. 144 Therefore, if it had been proven that Qualcomm
committed improper activities that hampered the domestic
competition environment, the sanction imposed upon Qualcomm
should have been upheld. Any factor outside the scope of ensuring
fair competition, such as economic factors, should not have been
taken into consideration by the TFTC. The TFTC’s agreement to
settle with Qualcomm weakens its authority and purpose.145
140
The details of the proposed commitment is confidential and therefore
not publicly available.
141
The details of the proposed commitment is confidential and therefore
not publicly available.
142
Two dissented commissioners believed to have been betrayed by their
colleague and resigned after the TFTC had signed the settlement agreement with
Qualcomm. See [The TFTC] Agreed to Qualcomm Investment Instead of
Fines―2 Fair Trade Commissioners Resigned Angrily and Criticized [the TFTC
for] “Putting the Cart Before the Horse”, UP MEDIA (Aug. 11, 2018),
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=46061
[https://perma.cc/Q43V-NYZQ].
143
Besides for the TFTC, there are five independent agencies in Taiwan.
They include the National Communications Commission, the Central Bank, the
Financial Supervisory Commission, the Transportation Safety Board and the
Central Election Commission. These independent agencies are required to
faithfully implement their duties without tilting toward any specific person,
political parties, or interest groups.
144
See Ceng, infra note 145.
145
See Yan Ting-Dong & Zhang Hong Hao, Can Qualcomm's Settlement
Really Work? HOUSEFUN |NEWS| (Aug. 11, 2018),
https://news.housefun.com.tw/news/article/100599203933.html
[https://perma.cc/YF8V-GWCR] (arguing that by agreeing to settle with
Qualcomm, the TFTC is weakening its authority and not doing its job); Ceng ZhiChao, Complexity of the Qualcomm Settlement Case, NAT’L POL’Y FOUND. (July
3, 2019), https://www.npf.org.tw/3/20981 [https://perma.cc/Q6V7-YPHY] (“The
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This criticism is only partially correct. The Fair Trade Act
article 1 states that “[t]his Act is enacted for the purposes of
maintaining trading order, protecting consumers interests, ensuring
free and fair competition, and promoting economic stability and
prosperity.” 146 As described by the plain meaning of the Act,
“economic stability and prosperity” are also factors that the TFTC
must consider when executing the law.147 In the Qualcomm case, the
primary concern was to punish Qualcomm for its improper licensing
and restrictive claims to others in the past and prohibit it from doing
the same in the future.148 A secondary concern was to ensure that
domestic communication industries are not hampered by the agency’s
actions. The first concern was achieved by imposing a large fine on
Qualcomm.149 As to the second concern, it could be argued that the
large fine originally imposed on Qualcomm was enough to deter it
from further improper activities, and that the sanctions could even
help promote the domestic competitive environment. However, that
argument only holds true with respect to Qualcomm’s horizontal
competition. As noted earlier, Qualcomm owns many patents in
CDMA, WCDMA and LTE related technologies, some of which
overlap with what some Taiwan-based competitors have been
first thing that was injured was the prestige of the law enforcement of the fair as
an independent agency!”).
146
Fair Trade Act, supra note 80, Art. 1.
147
See Xu You-Ning, The Development Trend of the Qualcomm Case—
The Judgment of the U.S. Federal District Court and Taiwan Fair Trade
Commission's Settlement with Qualcomm, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW
INSTITUTE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://stli.iii.org.tw/articledetail.aspx?no=64&tp=1&d=8322 [https://perma.cc/Q7LB-JJFV] (countering
criticism of the TFTC’s economic development motivation in the Qualcomm
settlement with the Fair Trade Law’s requirement that the legal system promote
economic stability).
148
See Gaotong Longduan Shichang Xingwei, Woguo Gongpinghui
Zhongfa 234 yi (高通壟斷市場行為，我國公平會重罰234億) [Heavy Fine for
Qualcomm by the Fair Trade Commission for Monopoly Practices], INNOVATION
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=13852
[https://perma.cc/DS2Z-HQXZ].
149
See Taishang dui Gaotong de Aihenjiuge (台廠對高通的愛恨糾葛)
[Taiwanese Manufacturers’ Love-hate Relationship with Qualcomm], TECH
ORANGE (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://buzzorange.com/techorange/2017/10/12/qualcomm-23billion-in-taiwan/
[https://perma.cc/6F5E-6LMT].
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researching for a while. MediaTek,150 for example, is a non-factory
semiconductor company that provides system chip solutions for
wireless communications, high-quality televisions, DVDs and Bluray discs, and also considered a horizontal competitor of Qualcomm.
Companies like MediaTek think that the TFTC’s sanctions against
Qualcomm definitely promote a more competitive environment.151
However, companies that rely heavily on Qualcomm’s
advanced technologies would simply hope to build a firm relationship
with Qualcomm and get the support they need at a reasonable price,
rather than drive Qualcomm out of the Taiwan market. These
companies, which have a quasi-vertical relationship with
Qualcomm, 152 worry that the TFTC’s sanction against Qualcomm
may frustrate further cooperation in many ways.153 While allowing
150

MediaTek provided a brief of amicus curiae at the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in support of the appellee in FTC v.
Qualcomm. Brief for Mediatek Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122),
2019 WL 3502777.
151
MediaTek has being insisted that TFTC should implement its sanction
against Qualcomm. Analyst considers MediaTek would be the one suffered most
from the settlement. See Gongpinghui yu Gaotong Hejie wei Changye Bandaoti
ye bu Maidan (公平會與高通和解為產業 半導體業不買單) [Fair Trade
Commission Settles with Qualcomm to Help the Industry, Yet the Semiconductor
Industry Doesn’t Buy It], CTR. NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://tw.news.yahoo.com/公平會與高通和解為產業-半導體業不買單105928194.html [https://perma.cc/8Z85-ZR88].
152
TSMC is one of the companies which has vertical cooperation
relationship with Qualcomm, according to analysis, TFTC 's settlement with
Qualcomm may further advance the domestic related industries in the future. See
Gaotong Dacheng Hejie Xuezhe: Chuangzao san Ying Jumian (高通達成和解 學
者：創造三贏局面) [Qualcomm Settles, Scholar: Win-Win for Three Parties],
CTR. NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 10, 2018), https://tw.news.yahoo.com 高通達成和解學者-創造三贏局面-065417357.html [https://perma.cc/WJQ3-ESK3].
153
See The Industrial Technology Research Institute Confirms that
Qualcomm’s 5G Cooperation Case has been Suspended, UP MEDIA (Oct. 25,
2017), https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=27528
[https://perma.cc/73R9-TFWN]. See also Jingjibu, Gongpinghui wei Gaotong An
Chaofantian (經濟部、公平會為高通案吵翻天) [The Ministry of Economic
Affairs and the Fair Trade Commission in Heated Argument Over the Qualcomm
Case], CREDERE MEDIA (Oct. 26, 2017),

https://www.cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/6354
[https://perma.cc/AR2W-P9GH].
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Qualcomm to continue its improper licensing activities would violate
Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act, and is a reason for sanctioning Qualcomm,
nevertheless, these sanctions would not solve the conundrum that
domestic companies would encounter. Sanctions alone would not be
helpful for the advancement of technology.154 Voices for a peaceful
multilateral beneficiary solution were equally as loud as those
advocating for punishment. After thorough evaluation, the TFTC
considered litigation settlement the better solution, which on the one
hand can direct the once distorted and unfair competition back on
track but on the other hand, it could help improve the development of
local communication technology.155 The TFTC’s decision did not
exceed the power it is delegated nor violate the purpose the Fair Trade
Act is expected to achieve.156 Besides, the TFTC’s decision still falls

154

Apple’s settlement with Qualcomm in the United States somehow
reflects the desperate need of cooperation for companies who have a quasivertical partner style relationship with Qualcomm in CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE
technologies. See David Faber & Kif Leswing, Qualcomm Surges After
Announcing a Settlement with Apple over Patent Royalties, CNBC (Updated Apr.
17, 2019, 5:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/16/apple-qualcomm-settleroyalty-dispute-sources-say.html [https://perma.cc/6EQD-KPPQ]; Pingguo yu
Gaotong Dacheng Hejie (蘋果與高通達成和解) [Apple and Qualcomm Reaches
Settlement], BUS. NEXT (Apr. 17, 2019),

https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/52952/apple-and-qualcomm-todrop-all-litigation [https://perma.cc/85W8-B3NS]. Apple case implied that
cooperation, not sanction, is the better solution for the development of that
specific industry.
155
In a May 21, 2019 press release, the TFTC stated that after
considering the benefits of the competition mechanism under the regular
operation and the promotion of industrial economic benefits, it believes that
settling the case, instead of taking action, will promote the public interest in
addition to rapidly solving the administrative dispute. Press Release, Taiwan Fair
Trade Com’n, The [Taiwan] Fair Trade Commission and Qualcomm’s Litigation
Settlement, https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/14f21b11-a9b0-4119-b575d475db2a93f9.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK3F-ZXEN].
156
Since economic stability and prosperity are explicit factors that the
TFTC should consider when implementing its authority, the TFTC’s settlement
which was partially based on national economic benefit considerations are not
arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
458 (2001) (indicating that the Environmental Protection Agency has the power to
consider implementation costs with national air quality standards when making
rules).
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within its realm of discretion of a specialized authority, a territory in
which other government branches should defer.157
Transparency
Another critique for the Qualcomm settlement was the
transparency of the conditions both parties agreed upon and the denial
of petition for participation of concerning companies. The criticism
in fact focuses on one single issue, the openness of the procedure.158
Since Qualcomm and the TFTC both expressed their willingness to
reach a litigation settlement at the beginning of the trial, the court had
to assess the necessity of intervention of concerning companies for
the achievement of the settlement respectively. As explained above,
Qualcomm was the only company who directly suffered the sanction
imposed by the TFTC, which thus qualified it to file a complaint
against the TFTC in accordance with the law. Those who were
unfairly licensed by Qualcomm, though benefited from the TFTC’s
agency action against Qualcomm, did not have any standing to
participate in the settlement. They can only urge Qualcomm to
license based on the TFTC’s requirement of FRAND condition,
which is purely a benefit reflected from that agency action. The
reflected benefits cannot be considered a “legal right” to participate
in the settlement.159
Besides, part of the settlement conditions involving
Qualcomm’s future deployment and management worldwide, for the
sake of fair competition, were considered not suitable to be released
to the public.160 Should those concerning companies be allowed to
157

See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (stating that when a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, the challenge will fail).
158
See Liu Kung-Chung, On the Practice and Jurisprudence of the
Administrative Reconciliation of the Fair Trade Commission, 235 TAIPEI BAR J.
68, 68 (1999) (explaining the belief shared by some scholars that the details of
litigation settlement should be made public for review in order to prevent improper
bargains between government agencies and private persons).
159
Chang, supra note 25, at 119.
160
Unlike the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574,
TAPA does not provide any regulation or guideline relating to the confidentiality
of the dispute resolution proceedings, nor does TALA, IP Court hence referred to
Intellectual Property Case Adjudication Act Art. 9 and decided not to release details
of the settlement.
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participate in the settlement procedure, the confidentiality of the
content of the settlement would not likely be secured as expected.
Therefore, the content of the settlement and the proceess of making
the settlement possible, to some extent, will have to be kept opaque
instead of transparent.
Does Qualcomm Deserve a Settlement?
Some argue that Qualcomm not only licensed with
unreasonable conditions to vertical and horizontal counterparts in
Taiwan, but it also behaved the same way in every major market in
the world, causing it to be sanctioned by government agencies in
many different jurisdictions.161 From a comparative perspective, the
TFTC should not be the first national authority to spare Qualcomm’s
fault and retrieve the sanction it has imposed. The TFTC’s retreat
implied its inaccuracy of making the first agency action.
Qualcomm did violate many regulations and deserve harsh
punishment. The TFTC’s sanction not only punishes Qualcomm for
its past improper activities, but also deters Qualcomm from
committing further violations of the law. As punishment and
deterrence are the major issues that draw public concerns, therefore,
any measures that can achieve similar effects should be considered
feasible options.
According to the conditions consented in the settlement,
Qualcomm has agreed to not dispute the $88 million NTD fine it has
161
Qualcomm was sanctioned in almost every major jurisdiction,
including the US, the EU, South Korea, China, and Japan. See JFTC Revokes
Order, Finds Qualcomm Licensing Program Lawful, QUALCOMM (Mar. 14,
2019), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2019/03/14/jftc-revokes-orderfinds-qualcomm-licensing-program-lawful [https://perma.cc/296G-TGEF]
(describing that the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a cease-anddesist order to Qualcomm in the year 2009 confining Qualcomm from improper
cross-licensing activities. Following a nine-year evidentiary proceeding, JFTC
reversed the order itself). See also Korea Fair Trade Commission defeats
Qualcomm's antitrust appeal in court, but Qualcomm will appeal—and violate—
further, FOSS PATENTS (Dec. 7, 2019),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/12/korea-fair-trade-commission-defeats.html
[https://perma.cc/N7AW-FSCY] (describing the sanctioning of Qualcomm in
Korea); Qualcomm.Inc., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0199/qualcomm-inc
[https://perma.cc/JJP6-VMCL] (describing the sanctioning of Qualcomm in the
U.S.).
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paid, has promised that it will renegotiate in good faith with domestic
mobile phone manufacturers and chip suppliers, has agreed to
continue to provide chips in accordance with FRAND requirement
during the time period of negotiation, and has agreed to cease taking
further legal actions or withdraw all pending legal cases, etc., all of
which seem to meet the “punishment and prevention” purpose the
advocates of harsh punishment called for. 162 As the TFTC never
agreed to excuse Qualcomm’s future improper activities, Qualcomm
might still be sanctioned should it commit any further inappropriate
deeds. One might still argue that the settlement heavily relies on
Qualcomm’s good will, and that an insurance which lacks any legal
policy is meaningless. As pros and cons do always exist in almost
every social policy and public concerns in every aspect, it is likely
impossible to achieve a perfect solution and satisfy every interest
group for every controversy. And, since Qualcomm is already deeply
rooted in Taiwan, it seems still too early to anticipate whether
Qualcomm will risk its reputation in the domestic market, and
worldwide as well. Therefore, it is simply too early to conclude
whether or not Qualcomm will dishonor its promises or should it
deserve the settlement this far.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

Government agencies, delegated by Taiwan’s Legislative
Yuan (equivalent to the Congress in the U.S.), have the power to
make rules, enforce policies, and punish those who violate the
regulations promulgated by them; however they must still comply
with legal norms when executing their duties. When making
decisions, government agencies must give consideration to both the
public good and private interests. When different interests are in
conflict, public interests should normally prevail. However, when
interpretations of public interests vary, the Legislative Yuan did not
explain who will be the most suitable authority to give the final
definition. The confusion can only be clarified by referring to the
designer's blueprint of democracy. According to the principles of

162

See FTC News Release, supra note 127.
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“checks and balances”163 and “separation of powers”,164 the judiciary
should be the one to oversee duties or responsibility through the
mechanism of judicial review of government agencies actions. 165
When reviewing, there are still some domains where the judicial
branch is not allowed to lay its hand, such as the decision made in
accordance with the expertise of a government agency.166 Should the
government agency action be proven not arbitrary or capricious, the
judicial branch normally defers.167
As explained above, government agencies are supposed to
evaluate and balance contradictory interests before making decisions.
In other words, any government agency made decision is supposed to
have considered every relevant interest.168 The court can only review
the agency's actions after they have been made. And, due to the lack
of resources of expertise, and for the sake of the principle of the
separation of powers 169 and the deference to the expertise of the
163

See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches,
and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO L. REV. 175, 183 (1990) (detailing the
principle of checks and balances and how it would be carried out).
164
Id. at 182−186. See also KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 38–40 (2nd ed. 2014); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (explaining the principle of separation of
powers).
165
5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. See also Bowen v. Michigan Acad. Fam.
Physician, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)
166
See Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(describing that, other than the discretionary realm of the government agency, the
agency’s conduct must fall within the definition of “agency action” in order to
qualify for judicial review).
167
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843−44 (1984).
168
In fact, TFTC formulates an internal guideline called “Principles for
handling Administrative Settlement for the Fair Trade Commission,” providing
the factors which should be considered when committing to administrative
settlement. According to the Art. 2 of the guideline, the factors are: (1)
legitimacy and appropriateness of the concession; (2) the maintenance of public
interest; and (3) damages that the interested party may suffer as a result of the
settlement. TFTC,
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=175&docid=288
[https://perma.cc/K78B-5JC5] (last visited May 28, 2021).
169
For a better understanding of the system and function, see Keith
Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681, 2682–83
(1996) (describing the powers granted to the federal government and the
separation of powers).
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administrative agency, the judicial branch should not make decisions
on behalf of the government agency. Unless the agency’s action is
inconsistent with its prior precedents or rules, 170 otherwise courts
normally defer, even to that of the discretionary decision of
distribution of regulatory benefits. 171 As the Supreme Court of
United States explained in Heckler v. Chaney172 that administrative
decision making “often involves a complicated balancing of a number
of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”
However, if the interest gained from the execution of the agency
action upon people is lesser than the national interest for which the
action is supposed to achieve, whether to continue the agency action
should then be prudently reconsidered.
Figure 1: Settlement Rate

170

See, e.g., Clifford v. Peña, 77 F.3d 1414, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the federal agency acted consistently with prior precedents and
rules); Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1556
(7th Cir. 1985) (finding that CFTC need only comply and enforce its own rules).
171
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972) (holding that a non-tenured professor is not entitled to review his dismissal
even if no reasons were provided); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988) (“[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow.”).
172
Heckler v. Chaney 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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In Taiwan, it is rare to settle administrative disputes in trial
proceedings, and it is even rarer to settle large monetary value
administrative disputes, such as Qualcomm’s case. According to the
statistics (see chart above), the settlement rate of the Taiwan High
Court civil cases is almost 5 to 6 times higher than the cases of the
Taiwan Administrative High Court in the time period from 2009 to
2017. In the year 2017 the gap between total cases and cases settled
surprisingly reached almost 10 times. One major reason for the
rareness of achieving a settlement in administrative trial proceeding
is the anxiety of the executive authorities’ consideration for the
unnecessary public suspicion a settlement may cause.173 For example,
whether or not there is any improper exchange of interests between
the executive authorities and the punished persons. Unlike civil cases,
administrative cases usually involve public interests or fundamental
administrative principles that are applicable to all pending or future
cases, sometimes even to government agencies’ decision
making. Therefore, compared with their colleagues in civil court,
administrative court judges are more reluctant to risk the unnecessary
suspicion from the public to convince the involving parties to settle
the case.174
Taking Qualcomm and the TFTC litigation settlement for
example, after the settlement was achieved by the two parties; the
involved industries have different opinions, the Control Yuan175 has
173

Other considerations like budget control from the supervisory
authority and administrative supervision from superior authority etc. always make
government agencies reluctant to commit to settlement in litigation. LIOU &
PENG, supra note 31, at 493.
174
For details of the critiques of court dominated settlement procedure,
see WU GENG & CHANG WUN-YU, ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE LAW 473–474
(2018) (criticizing judges for pushing parties to settle for the sole purpose of
avoiding the trouble of litigating and writing court opinions).
175
The Control Yuan is the highest supervision branch of the state which
has the power to supervise the government and censure all public servants,
including the judicial branch. According to Art. 24 of the Control Act stipulates
that the Control Yuan, after investigating the work and facilities of the Executive
Yuan and its subordinate organizations, shall propose corrective measures to the
Executive Yuan or its subordinate organs for improvement after these measures
have been deliberated and approved by the relevant committee meetings. After
receiving the proposal, the Executive Yuan or related organizations shall make
improvements or take other actions immediately and reply to the Control Yuan in
writing. The Control Yuan can also impeach all civil servants, those in the
judicial branch included. The aforementioned system was designed in accordance

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/2

470

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 16

proposed a correction to the TFTC,176 and the Legislative Yuan177
requires the Chairman of the TFTC to report to the Legislative
Council,178 all of which are sufficient to illustrate the challenges that
may arise from the litigation settlement.
As in any trial case, the considerations or interests of both
sides are always contradicted, and the outcome of the proceedings is
unlikely to satisfy everyone involved. Similarly, the outcome of the
settlement is unlikely to satisfy everyone whose rights or interests are
affected. Reconciliation, after all, is the second-best option for both
sides. From the perspective of saving litigation costs, speeding up
with the concept of Dr. Sun Yet-Sen, the founding father of the Republic of China
(Taiwan). According to Dr. Sun’s concept, the impeachment power of the
legislative branch was separated and transferred to the Control Yuan, which
constitutes a major difference between Taiwan and the Constitution of U.S. Art.
1, §§ 6-7. For more information about the political system of Taiwan, please refer
to GOVERNMENT PORTAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://taiwan.gov.tw/3866.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
176
The Control Yuan considered that TFTC’s settlement with
Qualcomm, agreeing on Qualcomm’s promises to sign a “no mutual complaint”
contract with competitors in the industry, as well as to expand investment in
exchange for fines, not only has excessively intervened in the market mechanism,
but also violated the principle of prohibition of improper connection. The
settlement negotiation was completed in only 4 months, and the process was
hasty, the procedure was not open and transparent. The Supervisory Office of the
Control Yuan therefore proposed to correct the Fair Trade Commission. See
generally Gongpinghui yu Gaotong Gongsi Dacheng Hejie (公平會與高通公司
達成和解) [Fair Trade Commission and Qualcomm Reaches Settlement],
CONTROL YUAN (May 21, 2019),
https://www.cy.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=124&sms=8912&s=13429
[https://perma.cc/CC2U-DVU2] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
177
The Legislative Yuan of Taiwan has the power to decide by
resolution upon statutory or budgetary (final accounts) bills, or bills concerning
martial law, amnesties, declarations of war or peace, treaties, and other important
affairs of the state. For details, please refer to LEGISLATIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (TAIWAN) https://www.ly.gov.tw/EngPages/List.aspx?nodeid=345
[https://perma.cc/3DEP-T8WS] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020) (describing functions
of different entities in Taiwanese government).
178
Zhonghua Minguo Lifa Yuan (中華民國立法院) [The Legislature
Yuan of R.O.C.], Dijiujie Diqi Huiqi Jingji Weiyuanhui Dishisi Ci Quanti
Weiyuan Huiyi (第九屆第七會期經濟委員會第十四次全體委員會議) [The
Fourteenth Committee Meeting of the Seventh Session of the Ninth Term of the
Economic Committee] available at
https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=33132&pid=183194
[https://perma.cc/E3DH-THVL] (Chinese version, last visited Jun. 17, 2020).
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dispute resolution, and seeking the best interests of the litigants as a
whole, litigation settlement still has its value. In order to reduce
suspicion, the administrative court must ensure that the public interest
will not be sacrificed and that the overall interests of the state can be
secured. Although sometimes the benefit of litigation settlement to
public interests may not emerge immediately, the efficacy of
litigation settlement still cannot be ignored.
Through Qualcomm’s litigation settlement with the TFTC,
this paper explains the relevant provisions of Taiwan’s
Administrative Litigation Act on litigation settlement, as well as the
role and reasoning of the court in the litigation settlement process.
From a result-oriented theory, Qualcomm’s case is a successful
example. However, this does not mean that all administrative
disputes are suitable for litigation settlement; the court still has to be
cautious and prudent when handling each and every case.
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